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Participation, planning and natural resources  
in Bolivia: from fiction to practice? 
Lorenzo Pellegrini 
Abstract 
In this paper, we focus on participation in the main planning documents produced in 
Bolivia in the first decade of the 2000s: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and 
the National Development Plan (PND). We analyze how these planning instruments have 
been able to capture popular participation through diverse mechanisms and how these 
practices fit in the current mainstream participation discourse. Special attention is paid to 
natural resources because of the predominant role they have in the Bolivian economy and 
because of their substantial contribution to the state budget.  
The Bolivian experience shows an apparent paradox: while the process leading to the PRSP 
followed participatory guidelines and the PND did not, the resulting PRSP failed to include 
the most pressing demands of social movements, while the PND succeeded in including 
them. 
This case shows how the articulation of political processes escapes simplistic 
characterizations and the application of ‘out of the textbook’ participation might result in 
highly exclusionary outcomes. It also shows that the voice of social movements can take 
unexpected paths and have a profound influence on political events that go well beyond 
the possibility of standardized participatory processes.  
Keywords: National Development Plan, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Participation, 
Natural resources 
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INTRODUCTION 
Participation through the 1980s and 1990s has become one of the keywords in 
development discourse and its principles have influenced policy design and implementation 
throughout the world (Chambers, 1983; Cornwall and Eade, 2010). Concomitantly with the 
rapid spread of participatory methods, concerns have been raised on whether participation 
has been defeating its original purposes –ultimately contributing to the establishment of 
tyrannies rather than to people’s empowerment– and/or whether the mainstreaming of 
participation has been mere talkatism with little effect on practices (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). These debates have especially focused on developing countries, since development 
institutions are the ones that have embraced participation more wholeheartedly (e.g. World 
Bank, 1996). In this paper, we focus on participation in the main planning documents 
produced in Bolivia in the first decade of the 2000s: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(approved in 2000,Gobierno de Bolivia, 2001) and the National Development Plan 
(approved in 2006; Gobierno de Bolivia, 2006). The purpose is to analyse how these 
planning instruments have been able to capture popular participation through diverse 
mechanisms and how these practices fit in the current mainstream participation discourse. 
Special attention is paid to natural resources because of the predominant role they have in 
the Bolivian economy and because of their substantial contribution to the state budget. 
Bolivia offers a fertile ground for analysis because the country has been undergoing deep 
transformations in the period since 2006 when the country –that was traditionally ruled by 
a conservative establishment marked by political instability– experienced the ascendency of 
the political group ‘Movement Towards Socialism’ (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) and 
the election of the first indigenous president –Evo Morales. The MAS –as the name already 
suggest– is not a traditional political party, but rather a political movement and President 
Morales became first known as a trade union leader of coca farmers opposing neoliberal 
policies and US-sponsored anti-drug policies, rather than through electoral politics.1 The 
changes marking the new administration are evident in many policy choices and manifest 
themselves also in the approach to participation. Here we scrutinize how participation has 
been reconfigured by analysing the process to elaborate and the outcome of planning 
instruments in the country. 
Planning activities do not have direct bearing on policy results and are often met with some 
degree of scepticism. This attitude is even more prominent and justified in countries –such 
as Bolivia– where political instability renders the medium to long planning horizon well 
beyond the interest and influence of most governments. In this context of ephemeral 
policy-making and limited planning, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was of 
exceptional importance because its approval was a condition for debt relief and has 
coincided with the release of funds that were otherwise used to service debt. The 
availability of these funds increased considerably the policy space of national governments, 
hence the PRSP was a planning document bound to have immediate effect.    
The National Development Plan (PND) was equally, but diversely, important: the Morales 
government ascended to power in January 2006 and the PND –approved shortly 
afterwards– was prepared to give an articulated sense of direction to public policies beyond 
                                                
1 For a critical take on the change and continuity under Morales’ governments see Webber, 2010. 
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the announcements of the electoral period. Furthermore, the approval of the PND 
coincided with the nationalization process of hydrocarbons that resulted in increased public 
revenues that fed the state coffers. This increase was already announced in the PND and 
the spending and investing of these revenues is further given direction by the PND; in 
other words, this planning instrument became effective when the flow of financial 
resources to the state was to greatly increase –in accordance to what was indicated in the 
PND itself– and expenditure decisions were urgent.  The role and relevance of the PND is 
additionally enhanced by the fact that since 2006 Bolivia has experienced a remarkable 
degree of stability if compared to the previous decades. 
In this paper we examine in particular the different shape participation has taken in the 
PRSP and in the PND. We examine how the processes leading to these planning 
documents and how the results of these processes reflect different understandings of and 
approaches to participation. By juxtaposing processes and results we see that participation 
was high in the agenda of donors and prominent in the PRSP process, but largely absent in 
the discourse surrounding the PND.  
Participation in the PRSP of Bolivia has been the subject of numerous studies (e.g. 
Komives et al., 2003; Vos et al., 2003; Booth and Piron, 2004) and the policy changes and 
performance of Morales’ governments are also under close scrutiny (e.g. Webber, 2010), 
however no study so far has analysed the changes that relate to the ascendancy of Morales 
by concretely comparing the PRSP and the PND from the participation perspective. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: it produces a critical comparison between the 
PRSP and the PND of Bolivia adding to the emerging literature on policy changes that 
marked the ascendency of Morales and it does so by focusing on one specific planning 
instrument rather than providing more general/generic discussions on policy changes; it 
provides the first comparative analysis of the PRSP and the PND from a participation 
perspective focusing on the natural resources component of the plans; finally, it adds to the 
discussion of participation by unveiling –in a case study setting– some of the intricacies of 
applying participation models in practice.  
The collection of primary data for this article took place between 2006 and 2011. 
Government officials, members of non-governmental organizations, social movements and 
academics have been interviewed and the existing literature has been analysed to produce 
this article.  
The next section introduces the concept of participation in social sciences with a focus on 
development. Section 3, introduces the PRSP of Bolivia analysing both the process and its 
outcome and Section 4 analyzes the PND. Section 5 compares and puts the results into 
context with the methodological discussion (presented in Section 2). The last section 
concludes.    
PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
Participation was introduced in social sciences as a counter-hegemonic discourse 
instrumental to achieve empowerment and popular democracy (Chambers, 1983; Leal, 
2010). In development studies in particular, participation is characterised as a necessity to 
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understand poverty. Given the primary role of knowledge, participation is proposed for its 
transformative power: it would change the role of outsiders vis á vis those living in the 
periphery in the learning process, and promote the articulation of policy objectives based 
on the rights of marginalized people (Chambers, 1995; Kanbur and Squire, 2001). In this 
context, participation –or putting the last first– is instrumental for empowering the poor –
previously unseen and unknown– to tackle their condition and improve their lot through 
self owned strategies (Chambers, 1983; 1995).  
Starting from the 1980s and throughout the 1990s participation has been mainstreamed in 
development discourse which has been coupled by a silencing of its most eminently 
political characters (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Participation and participatory approaches 
have been embraced by numerous organizations to the point of becoming a new 
hegemonic discourse –if not an actual practice– in development. 
The process of recognition of participation and participatory methods involved the large 
development players; many of them have adopted participation in a instrumental and non-
political version– as it helps achieve the objectives of public policies and can facilitate 
efficiency (Francis, 2001: 72). Among the endorsers of participation there are multilateral 
financial institutions, for example the World Bank defines participation as ‘the process by 
which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policymaking, resource 
allocations, and/or program implementation’ and in the context of poverty reductions 
strategies ‘can help build ownership over the strategy, make it more equitable to and 
representative of various stakeholder interests, increase the transparency of the policy 
formulation process, and, ultimately, make the strategy more sustainable’ (Tikare et al., 2001: 
237; World Bank, 1996; cf. Cooke, 2004). 
Participation has further developed into one of the key buzzwords and fuzzwords of 
development studies and practice (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Leal, 2010). The meaning has 
been watered-down and participation has entered the mainstream development discourse, 
becoming a new rule, or even a tyranny. 
Participation is imputed to have been transformed into a tyranny in three distinct senses 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 9-10). In the first sense, ‘decision-making and control’ 
participatory processes replace alternative, legitimate and socially-endorsed policy-making 
and accountability mechanisms. A second sense is the ‘tyranny of the group’, where 
participatory processes selectively further empower elites. The third sense is the ‘tyranny of 
the method’, where participation methods prevent other –more effective or more 
acceptable– methods from being used in research and decision making.  
We would like to stress participation tyranny in a fourth sense where participation is used 
as a rhetorical mean to legitimize outcomes favoured by powerful agents. In this context 
participation could easily be interpreted as a meaningless exercise of window-dressing; 
however the instrumental use of the participation rhetoric is rather consequential. The 
participation rhetoric is deployed precisely because it provides external justification for 
specific processes and outcomes and to serve purposes that are in contrast with the 
participatory ideal. As such, this rhetoric provides further justification to the choices made 
by policy makers and further ammunition to silence oppositions. The outcome of 
processes that employ participation rhetoric are more legitimate because they can be 
presented as the ‘voice of the people’ and are not solely the product of government (or any 
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other decision body) decisions. Furthermore, participatory processes –however flawed– 
provide a chance to be included and if some individuals and organizations opt for non 
participation, their legitimacy as critics of the outcomes can be jeopardized. Ultimately, 
participation as a rhetorical tyranny, further empowers the discourse of policy makers, 
silences the opposition and creates an obstacle to dialogue. In the longer run, this tyranny 
will also undermine the stakeholders’ trust in genuine participatory methods.  
PARTICIPATION AND PLANNING IN BOLIVIA: THE POVERTY 
REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER 
The ‘Highly Indebted Poor County’ (HIPC) debt initiative –launched in 1996 and 
broadened in 1999– is a joint World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme 
‘to ensure that no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage’. The ultimate 
purpose of the programme is to enhance poverty reduction.2  
Several conditions have to be met by countries to qualify for debt relief in the HIPC 
initiative, among them the requirement to design of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP).3 If compared to the standard conditions applied by multilateral financial 
institutions for disbursing loans, the approval of PRSPs represents a different type of 
conditionality oriented to country ownership, rather than to fulfil the demands of the 
donors. The whole process should make sure that the resources that are freed up through 
debt relief are effectively invested in poverty reduction-oriented activities. These activities 
should follow a strategy that has been drafted through an inclusive participatory process in 
the ‘recipient’ country.  
Bolivia has been one of the first countries to go through the HIPC and elaborate a PRSP.  
The PRSP of Bolivia was produced in a special context conditioned by the existence strong 
social organizations (social movements and NGOs, including many indigenous 
organizations) that characterize the country. Furthermore, the presence in Bolivia of many 
development cooperation initiatives (whose discourse and practices had already embraced 
participation in the early 1990s) and the numerous social organizations resulted in several 
initiatives promoting participation that anticipated the PRSP and that set the stage for the 
process (Molenaers and Renard, 2003). 
In particular, the so-called second generation reforms of the 1990s (contrasted to the first 
generation reforms of the 1980s related to meeting the macroeconomic policy conditions 
associated with the structural adjustment programs) included the Law of popular 
participation (Ley de partecipacion popular, Gobierno de Bolivia, 1994). One of the 
outcomes of the law was the initiative to start national dialogues. The first national dialogue 
took place in 1997 and resulted in a plan for sustainable growth, social development, 
institutional strengthening, and eradication of drugs.  
The second national dialogue –launched in April 2000– took place during the formulation 
of the PRSP and the dialogue was considered the instrument to achieve the approval of a 
                                                
2 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm 
3 http://go.worldbank.org/TGL85HNSP0 
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strategy that would be the result of an inclusive participatory process.4 The dialogue was 
carried out through roundtables that took place at the municipal, departmental and national 
level and it involved more than 2,000 people from 318 municipalities (UNDP, 2004:3; 
Morrison and Singer, 2007). 5,6  
The dialogue did involve numerous social organizations, however other organizations that 
were involved in the first national dialogue did not take part because of their 
disillusionment with the previous participatory process and its outcome (UNDP, 2004). 
These self-excluded organizations comprise farmer unions and indigenous confederations 
that are prominent political actors in the country.7  
The resulting PRSP was marked by the plan to implement financial decentralization (at the 
departmental and municipal level) and the prioritization of disbursement in municipalities 
characterized by higher poverty levels. (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2001). These policy changes are 
eminently linked with the results of the Dialogue. At the same time, the secretary 
(Secretaria Tecnica del Dialogo) that organized the Dialogue was composed mostly by 
Bolivian professionals belonging to the Municipalista tendency – endorsing decentralization 
at the municipal level. Essentially, the adherent to this tendency argue that municipalities 
are better governance institutions –if compared to central governments– because they are 
closer to the people (Komives et al., 2003: 25). Furthermore these policies are also in line 
with the global decentralization trends and with the Bolivian processes linked with the Law 
of Popular Participation and the decentralization processes of the 1990s. 
Apart from these financial points linked with decentralization, also the issue of social 
control as defined in the strategy and sanctioned in the Dialogue law, appears to be an 
answer to the concerns raised by social organizations in the process. The objective of the 
social control mechanisms is to improve governance through accountability. Nevertheless, 
the prominent role in these mechanisms given to the Catholic Church is also a reflection of 
the power of certain institutions –such as the Episcopal Confederation– in the workings of 
the Dialogue and their influence on the results. 
On other parts of the PRSP, the lack of relation between the results of the dialogue and the 
final strategy has been denounced by many observers and participants in the process (e.g. 
UNDP, 2004; UNDP, 2006; Komives et al., 2003). On the one hand, this lack of relation 
was already present in the conclusions of the dialogue itself, where participants complained 
about several problems with respect to the process of the dialogue, including the fact that a 
                                                
4 The national dialogues became also formalized in a subsequent law (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2001), 
that was followed by a third national dialogue in 2003-2004 (see 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/96919/Boli_0304/Bo_0304/DIALOGO-
2003D.pdf; Morrison and Singer, 2007). 
5 The process itself was also financed by the donors, through a coordination of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) that disbursed 300,00 USD to social organizations, most notably 
the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church, to finance their involvement in the dialogue. 
6 The methodology used in the dialogue is the ZOPP (in German 'Zielorientierte Projektplanung', 
in English 'Objectives-Oriented Project Planning'), widely applied by the World Bank. See 
http://go.worldbank.org/JYYZRSVG10.  
7 A shared conclusion of organizations of civil society that participated in the 1997 dialogue is that the results 
reflected more the thinking of technocrats and of the government rather than of society (Komives et al., 2003 
:24). 
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narrow agenda had been set before the dialogue started. An additional preliminary problem 
–possibly associated with any participatory process– is that many social organizations did 
not participate. Also, some actors that did participate en masse –most notably members of 
political parties and the Catholic Church– were able to dominate the process. Furthermore, 
there were some difficulties because conclusions and recommendations achieved at the 
local level, were not sufficiently discussed at the national level nor included in the final 
account of the dialogue (UNDP, 2006). 
When it comes to the inclusion of the recommendations coming from the dialogue into the 
PRSP, we note that the staff that coordinated the dialogue was not in charge of drafting the 
strategy. Overall, some of the organizers of the Dialogue 2000 conclude that the PRSP was 
the ‘antithesis of the dialogue’ (Komivez et al. 2003: 38-41) and that there were 
considerable discrepancies between the results of the dialogue and the PRSP (Booth and 
Piron, 2004; Eyben, 2004; Vos et al., 2003).  
Most importantly, several participants to the Dialogue and also the drafters of the PRSP 
noted that the primary purpose of the strategy was to obtain debt relief. Since the decision 
on the relief would be taken by the IMF and World Bank personnel, the whole PRSP was 
geared towards that audience and had to fulfil the requests of the donors. The strategy 
eventually was based mostly on inputs from the donors (bilateral and multilateral) and the 
government rather than on the results of the dialogue (Komives et al., 2003 : 38).     
In any case, the process leading to and the resulting PRSP were considered satisfactory by 
the World Bank and the IMF. The completion point letter accepts that some limitations in 
the participatory process were present, but note also that such limitations pertain to any 
process and continue to praise the PRSP for the depth of its analysis and its remarkable 
ambitions (IMF and IDA, 2001). On the basis of these considerations the decisions that 
the HIPC process had reached the completion point (and debt relief was hence granted 
irreversibly) was taken (IMF and WB, 2001). Other observers –especially staff from 
bilateral donors– involved in the PRSP process was much less impressed specifically with 
respect to the shape taken by the participatory process and by the lack of government’s 
commitment to genuine inclusive dialogues (Molenaers and Renard, 2003).  
Natural resources and the PRSP 
When we analyze the participatory process leading to the PRSP even more telling than the 
content of the National Dialogue are the issues that have been included and the ones that 
have been excluded. Of particular significance is the glaring omission of natural resources 
in the PRSP. The overall importance of the primary sector for the national economy is 
difficult to overlook, and issues related to them were at the centre of several demands of 
social movements and conflicts that have generated ‘resource wars’ (Dangl, 2007; Hylton 
and Thomson, 2004).   
The omission of natural resources in the PRSP is evident once we consider the importance 
of the primary sector in the Bolivian economy: essentially the economic history of the 
country can be summarized as a succession of export led booms and busts. The sectors 
leading these cycles in the last three decades include hydrocarbons and mining (e.g. Sachs, 
2005). Overall extractive industries, next to commercial and subsistence agriculture form 
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the base of the economy. In terms of agriculture, the issue of land tenure and distribution 
have been objects of contention for several decades (e.g. Pellegrini and Dasgupta, 
forthcoming). 
Moreover, issues related to natural resources ownership and management are central to the 
historical demands of social movements: land, water, hydrocarbons and mining. The issue 
of land distribution and ownership –that was crucial during the 1952 revolution– continued 
to be a priority that the land reform of 1996 was not capable of addressing –primarily 
because of the lack of implementation. In the very days of the national dialogue, conflict 
related to natural resources escalated and the ‘water war’ broke out in Cochabamba. The 
clash spurred by water tariff increases associated with the privatization of water alliance, 
saw an heterogeneous opposition group of social movements that successfully demanded 
the re-publicization of water (Dangl, 2007). The simmering tensions, already evident at the 
beginning of the decade, deflagrated in the 2003 confrontations when natural resources and 
especially the issue of nationalization of hydrocarbons and mining played a crucial role 
(Hylton and Thomson, 2004).  
On the one hand, the choice to exclude natural resources from the agenda of the PRSP can 
be motivated by the very fact that they are such a controversial issue and that their 
inclusion could have derailed the participatory process. On the other hand, this omission is 
indicative of the little commitment towards genuine participation in the process as well as 
signalling the inability of the Bolivian state to manage its natural endowments in ways that 
would be supported by the general population and by social movements. 
PARTICIPATION AND PLANNING IN BOLIVIA: THE NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
The National Development Plan in many countries in an instrument for the 
implementation of the PRSP (e.g. in Nicaragua, see Pellegrini, 2011). However, in the 
Bolivian case the PRSP –together with the government that approved it– was short-lived 
and there was very little implementation of it. In this context, the PND is actually a new 
development plan that represents the most elaborated and comprehensive expression of 
Morales’ objectives and policies to achieve them (Mendonça Cunha and Santaella 
Gonçalves, 2010). 
The Bolivian PND is largely unexplored by the literature and while numerous critical 
assessments of the achievements of Morales’ governments and of its development model 
are available (e.g. Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010) no author anchors them on the PND (for an 
exception see Webber, 2008; Mendonça Cunha and Santaella Gonçalves, 2010).  
The specific issue of participation in the PND has been neglected even though Morales’ 
election has been supported and in many ways is an expression of social movements. This 
absence of studies on the topic stands in stark contrast with the copious literature on the 
PRSP that focuses on participation. Furthermore, while the PRSP was never fully 
implemented, Morales had 5 years (to date) to produce policies that are (also) inspired by 
the PND. 
Evo Morales was elected in December 2005 and became president in January 2006. The 
election of Morales was supported by a convergence on his candidacy by a large group of 
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various opposition groups and social movements. The electoral program reflected many of 
the demands of these opposition groups and later was used as an input in the PND. The 
main lines of the PND have been presented and socialized in Bolivia, but there was no 
formal participatory mechanism before its approval. The PND was announced in April and 
published already in June 2006 (Sanjines, 2006, Gobierno de Bolivia, 2006), a very tight 
timeline for a new government presenting such an ambitious plan. The plan itself dictated 
that its content should be validated during its dissemination, however we could find no 
evidence of any participatory process of validation. 
Ironically, the PND –that was not the result of a formal participatory process—contains 
substantial mechanisms to improve participation in the governance structures of Bolivia 
and already in the introduction sets as one of the main objectives to ‘deepen democracy’ 
and ‘the effective participation of social, communitarian, citizens’ and productive 
organizations to eradicate poverty and social exclusion’ (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2006). The 
PND is articulated in 4 strategic lines: social policies, democratization and decentralization, 
the economy and international relations. The strategic line on democratization and 
decentralization is the most relevant in terms of governance: the introduction of popular 
participation materialized in the recognition of indigenous and peasant organizations 
together with collective forms of representation, the possibility to recall public officials 
(including the president), and the introduction of referenda on international policy. 
Natural resources in the PND 
The PND contains multiple discourses and contrasting objectives that become evident in 
the way the plan deals with natural resources. The heterogeneity of discourses and 
objectives can be traced back to two contrasting developing models: the neo-
developmentalist and the living-well (Zabala Vásquez, 2006, Mendonça Cunha and Santaella 
Gonçalves, 2010; Costoya, 2010). The neo-developmentalist model and discourse promote 
the extraction of natural resources and the appropriation of the revenues by the state in 
order to support social programs and investment towards socio-economic development. 
Essentially, this model endorses a re-allocation of resources –through which the national 
economy and especially the poor are benefitting vis a vis foreign multinational companies– 
but it does not change the structure of the economy. In contrast, the living-well discourse 
is a radical break with mainstream development models moving the focus from the 
objective of wealth creation through economic growth to the satisfaction of rights and 
dignity at the individual and collective level. In the living-well framework, the respect of 
nature is not instrumental to anthropogenic objectives, but rather an objective per se. 
These contrasting discourses are an accurate representation of the tensions within the 
support groups that have converged to support Morales in 2005. The use of both 
discourses is a signal of the future tensions that would split the camp supporting Morales 
and have been borrowed selectively by different institutions in the government and 
government members of different ideologies.  
These different discourses are manifest when it comes to natural resources. The neo-
developmentalist discourse emerges when dealing with the ‘strategic sectors’ of the 
Bolivian economy and the living-well discourse is evident in the section of the PND 
dealing with the new development model. 
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The discussion of strategic sectors includes sections on hydrocarbons and mining. 
According to the plan, the presence of the state in these sectors will be increased in order 
to enhance national sovereignty and guarantee that sufficient resources will be available for 
the development of the country. An expansion of extraction activities is foreseen and 
should be coupled by a process of industrialization of natural resources in order to enter 
into processes that generate value added to natural resources and to abandon the position 
of exporter of raw natural resources. This orientation is confirmed by the presence of 
mega-projects that envision large investments on the industrialization of hydrocarbons and 
minerals. 
The new development model –fitting in the living-well discourse– foresees a new 
understanding of welfare that is intrinsically linked with communitarian aspects of life and 
based on a harmonious relationship with nature. The living-well is based on the realization 
of objectives that are different from the western inspired access and accumulation of 
material goods and emphasises different meanings in the relationship between man and 
nature. 
Finally, an encompassing approach –that transcends the neo-developmentalist and the 
living-well discourses– is the one of nationalization of the hydrocarbons and mining 
sectors. The nationalization of these extractive sectors at the same time generates revenues 
for the state, but is also seen as a necessary step to achieve sovereignty and break away 
from the colonial past.   
COMPARING THE PRSP WITH THE PND 
The processes and outcomes of the PRSP and the PND are contrasting. The PRSP process 
was instrumentally inclusionary since the process was aimed at the fulfilment of donors’ 
requests of ‘country ownership’ and did involve the stakeholders in the formulation of the 
plan; however the way the agenda was set and the resulting document fomented the 
disillusionment with participatory processes. Our interpretation of the process is that the 
participation rules were being followed, but just with a rhetorical purpose. There were 
meta-rules of how a PRSP had to look (that were implicitly imposed by the donors 
themselves, manifest by the fact that PRSP across the globe followed similar formats) and 
conflicting interests across the parties that worked on the strategy (mainly the government, 
the technocrats and the social organizations present at the dialogues). Still –as evidenced by 
the fact that the PRSP was indeed approved by the donors– the ultimate objective of the 
PRSP was achieved and debt was forgiven. In other words, the process and the process 
was capable of fulfilling requirements and follow the accepted ‘rules’ of participation in the 
view of the donors.  
Even the achievements of the Dialogue 2000 and the PRSP in terms of decentralization 
and social control, cannot be identified with certainty as entirely genuine products of the 
participatory processes, because they fall squarely in line with the global development 
discourse at the time. It is all too easy to identify a relation between the global discourse on 
decentralization, governance and accountability and the position of the technocracts 
involved in the process as the leading forces beyond progressive measures contained in the 
PRSP and to see why the World Bank and IMF staff considered these positively in their 
assessment. 
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Considering the lack of formal participation in the PND, the process and the results stand 
in stark contrast. The MAS –that is, the government party– is itself channelling the voice of 
social movements and they do not require formalized participatory processes. Furthermore, 
the idea to have a standardized top-down participatory approach might be intrinsically 
flawed. Popular government is something that can exist only when it is demanded, while a 
top-bottom approach to participation –like the one implemented in the PRSP process– 
might simply be an oxymoron. In other words, we can think about participation as an 
exercise of freedom and as argued by Paulo Freire (1970) ‘Freedom is acquired by 
conquest, not by gift’ (see Leal, 2010).  
The content of the PND is more eminently Bolivian if compared to the PRSP. This can be 
a result of the fact that the government was not promoting the instrument just to fulfil 
donors’ requests, but was acting as its own initiative. Most notably, land, natural resources 
and nationalization are conspicuous absentee in the PRSP whose narrow agenda was not in 
line with the priorities of civil society and excluded a priori some of the most pressing issue 
in the politics of Bolivia at the time. Here the contrast of the PRSP with the PND could 
not be greater: while in the PRSP the participants to the dialogue were not allowed to 
discuss natural resources because they fell outside of the remit of the dialogue, these 
resources figure in the PND in several ways and are crucial in discussing the development 
model (the ‘living-well’) as well as the source of state revenues to be used for social policies 
and for national development (the ‘strategic sectors’ of mining and hydrocarbons). 
From the participatory perspective, it is paradoxical to note how the trust in these 
processes was eroded in Bolivia because of the way the national dialogues were 
implemented and the contrast between the opinion of the donors and the Bolivian civil 
society on the practice of participation and ownership. We must also note that the Morales 
government did not manage (nor attempted) to include any voice from the opposition in 
the PND. This might be a reflection of the failure to build a hegemonic and inclusive 
discourse for the Bolivian society that marks the Morales administration and might be a 
source of (present and future) conflict.  
Overall, the general experiences with the PRSP and the PND in Bolivia and the specific 
ways natural resources were dealt with, suggest that promoting participation in the form of 
standardized processes –as in the case of the PRSP– might result in processes that are 
characterised by ‘cosmetic’ participation. The resulting semblance of participation is not 
leading to any people’s empowerment, but rather represents an instance of the tyranny of 
participation rhetoric. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The PRSP process in Bolivia was an implementation of participatory models without real 
participation and resulted in a technocratic strategy reflecting primarily the priority of 
donors. In contrast, in the PND social movements did not formally participate in the 
formulation process, nevertheless their priorities and visions –even when contradicting– 
influenced the plan.  The contrast between processes and outcomes of the PRSP and the 
PND is evident once we note the saliency of natural resources in Bolivian socio-economic 
processes and the primacy of these resources in the claims and struggles of social 
movements. The participants of the PRSP process were essentially barred from discussing 
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the subject and the PRSP does not deal with these resources, while the PND without a 
formal participatory process devoted the due attention to natural resources and was able to 
capture the essence of the claims over natural resources that were put forward by social 
movements. This contrast highlights how the articulation of participation in practice can be 
a complex affair and how the application of participatory methodologies –without the 
necessary participatory political environment– can result in establishing rules without 
participation. At the same time, highly original processes can produce results that are much 
closer to the desires of social organizations and we can have cases of participation without 
rules.  
The experience of the Bolivian PRSP provides evidence on how top-down participatory 
approaches that follow pre-established schemes are difficult to implement. Furthermore, it 
shows a rhetorical implementation of participation in the development community that has 
further undermined the reliance on participation in Bolivia.  
On the contrary, in the PND no formal participatory process was set up and the exclusion 
of certain parts of the population is implicit in the way the plan was formulated. 
Paradoxically, the result is more consistent with the priorities of Bolivian social movements 
and of the population at large.  
Ultimately the Bolivian experience shows how the articulation in practice of political 
processes –in this case related to planning– escapes simplistic characterizations and the 
application of ‘out of the textbook’ participation might result in highly exclusionary 
outcomes. It also shows that the voice of social movements can take unexpected paths and 
have a profound influence on political events that go well beyond the possibility of 
standardized participatory processes. 
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